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1 Introduction: The problem of doxastic responsibility 
 
Our everyday practices reveal a commitment to the idea of doxastic responsibility. For instance, 
we say things like: “You shouldn’t believe everything that’s on YouTube!” or, “You ought to 
believe the best scientific evidence about climate change.” The idea of a responsible epistemic 
agent seems to be in the background when we say things like: “She gets all her news from the 
yellow press,” or “He’s read multiple studies on the subject.” These statements refer to 
epistemic norms, which in turn identify credible sources, good epistemic practices and 
trustworthy epistemic agents. Given that we are social beings that rely on each other for much 
of the information that we acquire, this makes sense. A practice for tracking whom to trust is 
vital. But simply evaluating beliefs as true of false is not enough; rather, we are interested in 
whether the belief is attributable to the agent, not merely an outcome of circumstantial luck. 
The idea of doxastic responsibility thus implies that beliefs are in some sense agentive and that 
they are subject to a prescriptive doxastic ought.
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However, responsibility as commonly understood applies to actions which seem to 
require voluntary control, and this prompts skeptical arguments against doxastic responsibility. 
The classical formulation of the skeptical position is by William Alston. He argued that 
deontological concepts such as duty, obligation, and responsibility apply only when we have 
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 It is important to emphasize at the outset that this does not mean moral responsibility for beliefs, but a 
distinctively epistemic assessment that targets one’s epistemic agency, e.g., an assessment of one’s credibility (cf. 
Kauppinen 2018). 
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direct voluntary control, and beliefs, at least in paradigmatic cases, are not under direct 
voluntary control (Alston 1988). Alston’s original argument was directed at a specific view in 
epistemology, epistemic deontology, which seeks to give the meaning of epistemological 
concepts such as justification and warrant in terms of deontic concepts like duties and 
obligations. However, the worry generalizes beyond this specific view. Insofar as responsibility 
requires voluntary control, beliefs do not seem to be the kinds of things for which we can be 
responsible. The implication is that a natural reading of our everyday language regarding 
doxastic oughts and responsibility must be revised, resulting in an error theory of such 
language. 
The pull of Alston’s argument can be illustrated by what Chrisman (2008) calls the no 
rewards principle (NRP): 
NRP: No matter how large the reward, S cannot simply decide to believe that p in order 
to collect that reward.  
Suppose I offered you 100 million euros to believe that Bernie Sanders is the President of the 
United States. The offer is tempting, but try as you might, you cannot change your belief simply 
by deciding to do so. By contrast, were I to offer a large reward for doing something you 
ordinarily would not do, say, eating rotten meat, it is up to you to decide to do so and collect 
the reward. Moreover, McHugh (2012) points out that the problem is not just with beliefs that 
you know to be false, but also beliefs for which you have no evidence whatsoever. Suppose that 
you were offered a large reward for believing that it rained on Aristotle’s 30
th
 birthday. You have 
no reason to believe this, and the reward cannot provide you with one, being of the wrong kind. 
It is impossible to form the belief solely for a reward. In other words, the no rewards principle 
seems to show that doxastic involuntarism (DI) is true: 
 DI: Doxastic states are not under effective voluntary control. 
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The skeptical position can then be summarized in the Anti-Deontology Argument. It is usually 
formulated in terms of the ought implies can principle (OIC), which has independent 
plausibility. 
The Anti-Deontology Argument: 
P1 If Doxastic Responsibility (DR) is true, then Doxastic Voluntarism (DV) is true 
P2 DI 
P3 DV is false (from P2) 
C DR is false (from P1, P3) 
The argument seems valid, and both P1 and P2 have strong intuitive appeal, but there are still 
many ways to resist it. Some deny P2, that is, endorse some form of doxastic voluntarism 
(Ginet 2001, Ryan 2003, Steup 2000, 2008, 2017), while others resist the ought-implies-can 
principle backing P1, arguing that the principle does not always hold (Sinnott-Armstrong 1984). 
The most headway can be made, however, by unpacking P1, which relies on an implicit 
premise. The missing premise is this: 
P1* Voluntary control is necessary for doxastic responsibility 
This paper assesses the different ways P1* has been resisted by relating the solutions to 
the conditions of responsibility operating in the background, sometimes implicit, sometimes 
explicit. I will start with a view which denies the premise by arguing that the doxastic ought does 
not require that the agent can follow it, moving then to views which deny only the ‘voluntary’ 
part of the premise, arguing that there is a distinctively epistemic kind of control which is 
necessary to doxastic responsibility. I will argue that both of these views run into problems 
which can be averted by adopting a specific view of responsibility which rejects control as a 
necessary condition for responsibility, and I sketch a way towards such a view. The idea is that 
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beliefs are agentive because they reveal the doxastic perspective from which they were formed 
and they are therefore attributable to the agent in the responsibility-implying sense. I will 
conclude by considering a possible objection. 
 
 
2 The No-Ought-Implies-Can strategy 
 
The first strategy of arguing against P1* is to deny that ought implies can in epistemic context 
(Feldman 2001, Kornblith 2001, Chrisman 2008). I will call it the No-Ought-Implies-Can 
strategy, or NOIC for short. The main insight within this strategy is that in epistemic context 
‘ought’ refers to standards of evaluation. 
The idea can be fleshed out in different ways. Feldman (2001) argues that doxastic 
oughts are akin to role-oughts that flow from the roles we play in social life, as teachers, parents, 
friends, and so on. What is important in this context is that these oughts do not seem to imply 
can: an incompetent teacher still ought to explain things clearly, but she cannot, and a bad 
parent ought to take better care of his children, even if he cannot. Feldman suggests that we 
should understand doxastic oughts as flowing from our roles as believers (Feldman 2001, 675): 
we ought to form our beliefs according to our evidence, rather than wishes or fears, even if we 
cannot help forming wishful beliefs from time to time. 
The problem with Feldman’s proposal is that unlike role-oughts, epistemic oughts seem 
to be categorical, like moral oughts (Kornblith 2001). Many of the roles we occupy are 
optional: an incompetent teacher can quit her job in order to pursue a career that brings out 
her talents; some people refrain from having children because they believe they would not be 
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able to take good care of them. By contrast, Kornblith argues, in the epistemic case we are not 
only making the conditional claim that if someone wants to be a good believer, she ought to 
believe so-and-so; we want to endorse an even stronger claim, that every individual ought to 
believe according to the evidence. Take a parallel case in the moral sphere: suppose that Kelly 
is a thief. Does it follow that as a thief she ought to steal as much as possible? Of course not. 
The moral obligation not to steal is not conditional on the role she plays, nor on the reasons 
she might have for occupying that role. Similarly, epistemic oughts are retained even if some of 
us underperform as an epistemic agent.
2
 Kornblith argues that the only way for Feldman to 
explain this contrast is to appeal to the fact that being a believer is not something we can escape. 
Unlike being a teacher, we cannot simply step out of our roles as epistemic agents. But 
inescapability is also an unsatisfactory explanation of the categoricity of certain obligations. To 
see why, Kornblith asks us to suppose that Kelly is not just a thief, but a kleptomaniac, who 
cannot escape being a kleptomaniac. It still does not follow that she has a moral obligation to 
steal. 
Kornblith’s argument is unsatisfactory as it stands because it seems plausible that 
kleptomania is not the kind of role which issues oughts or norms.
3
 But the argument can be 
revised to make it more robust. Inescapability has also been proposed as an explanation for the 
categoricity of obligations in the context of constitutivism, which seeks to draw substantial moral 
norms from the constitution of agency. For example, Christine Korsgaard argues that being an 
agent is a “necessary identity,” and that it follows from this that we are subject to certain 
 
2
 Note that Kornblith’s argument seems to suppose that role-oughts are conditional on our goals—the norms of 
being a good teacher apply to me because I aim to be a good teacher—and that this is the crucial difference 
between role-oughts and categorical oughts. But this need not be so: role-oughts do not seem to require goals in 
order to apply. Suppose that John does not care at all whether he is a good teacher or not. We would still say that 
as long as he actually is a teacher, the teacher-role-oughts apply to him. For this reason, role-oughts might seem 
categorical after all—unlike Kornblith claims—and just like moral and epistemic oughts are. However, this does not 
help Feldman, for he still needs to account for the plausible difference between teacher-oughts and epistemic 
oughts. In the next move in the dialectic, Kornblith supplies the inescapability argument to do just this, then goes 
on to reject it. 
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substantial demands by virtue of the inescapability of our roles as agents (Korsgaard 1996, 100-
102). In short, the argument is that agency issues substantial norms or reasons, and those 
norms or reasons are categorical because the role of an agent is inescapable. It could be argued, 
then, that our inescapable roles as agents include epistemic agency, and that this is the source of 
the categoricity of epistemic obligations. 
However, aside from the question of whether substantial norms can be derived from 
the thin notion of agency, inescapability as a source of categoricity has been refuted. 
Inescapability is the wrong kind of necessity on which to ground categorical obligations; what 
the constitutivist needs is normative necessity, not essential necessity. This is the crux of David 
Enoch’s famous ‘shmagency’ objection (Enoch 2006, 187-188). The difference between 
normative and essential necessity is well exemplified by Michael Smith (2015, 194, 198). He 
points out that besides being agents, we are also necessarily human, but the fact of that necessity 
clearly does not establish any analytic connection between our function as human beings and 
reasons for action. To function optimally as human beings, we have a reason to stay alive, be 
healthy, and produce offspring, but these reasons are not categorical; it is perfectly possible that 
there are no reasons to have children, to aim for health, and even to stay alive. It is conceivable, 
even if dismaying, that there are no reasons for human beings to exist, regardless of the 
(putative) fact that our whole biology is wired up for sustaining the existence of the human 
genome. So, even if we are necessarily human, no categorical obligations follow from this. 
Mere inescapability does not therefore suffice to account for the categorical nature of moral 
oughts, and therefore the categoricity of epistemic oughts is not explained by the inescapability 





 Of course, one may dispute the categoricity of epistemic norms. While Kornblith takes it simply as a given, 
others deny that epistemic norms are categorical at all (Heathwood 2009, Cowie 2014, 2016). By contrast, Cuneo 
(2007) and Rowland (2013) argue that epistemic discourse is essentially committed to the categoricity of epistemic 
norms. If epistemic error theory is right, then of course much of the present discussion is fundamentally 
misguided, so the arguments and conclusions here should be read as tentative in that respect. 
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Kornblith (2001) has an alternative suggestion. He retains the idea that some oughts 
flow from evaluations of what counts as good performance, but proposes that instead of roles, 
ideals are the source of epistemic oughts. For ideals to be able to guide our actions, they must 
take human limitations into account—an unreachable ideal loses its action-guiding power. At the 
same time, ideals should not be so closely connected with capabilities of individuals that we 
lose sight of the fact that sometimes people are incapable of reaching the ideal. According to 
this view, then, the duty of not stealing is a moral ideal, which is not undermined by the 
existence of kleptomaniacs, and the duty to believe according to evidence is similarly an 
epistemic ideal which is not undermined by the fact that sometimes people engage in wishful 
thinking. Reasonable ideals lie somewhere in the large middle ground between the 
superhuman and the all-too-human. Kornblith argues that once we recognize this, we see that 
doxastic oughts do not require the level of voluntary control that the anti-deontology argument 
demands. 
But ideals, too, fail to explain doxastic oughts. As stated at the beginning of this section, 
the main insight within the strategy is that, in epistemic context, ‘ought’ refers to standards of 
evaluation. This is not a sufficient solution to the problem, however, because standards of 
evaluation do not presuppose agency. It is common to distinguish between an ought that 
applies to actions and one that applies to states of affairs (Humberstone 1971, Harman 1977). 
Using ought language, we can either prescribe actions or evaluate states of affairs, where 
evaluation can target things such as cars and apples, without thereby attributing to them 
responsibility for being the way they are. Moreover, we evaluate things like weather and natural 
scenery without attributing to anyone responsibility for being the way they are. The problem 
with the simple NOIC view is thus that it equivocates between the evaluative and prescriptive 
readings of ‘ought.’  
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Chrisman (2008) has a more sophisticated take on the NOIC strategy, one that avoids 
unobtrusively equivocating between evaluative and prescriptive oughts. His solution relies on 
Sellars’s (1969) distinction between rules of action and rules of criticism, or ought-to-do’s and 
ought-to-be’s. Only the former kinds presuppose voluntary control, whereas the latter apply to 
states, how things ought to be. However, Chrisman, following Sellars, holds that these two kinds 
of oughts are importantly connected: rules of criticism materially imply rules of action. In other 
words, statements of the form: 
X ought to be in state S 
materially imply that 
(Other things being equal and where possible) one should bring it about that X is in 
state S (Chrisman 2008, 360). 
And, according to Chrisman (ibid., 364), doxastic oughts are of the form: 
X ought to be in doxastic attitude A towards proposition p under conditions C. 
Even though the ought here implies agency, it does not imply that the subject of the ought is 
capable of voluntarily following the rule in question. Compare with: 
 The beds ought to be made every morning 
which materially implies that: 
(Other things equal and where possible) one should bring it about that the beds are 
made every morning, 
but does not imply that the subject—the bed--is the one responsible for bringing it about. 
According to Chrisman, this solution manages to respect both doxastic responsibility and 
doxastic involuntarism because it allows believers to be open to criticism even if they do not 
exercise voluntary control in believing what they believe. 
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As stated above, Chrisman successfully avoids the problems of equivocation that 
Feldman and Kornblith are vulnerable to. Moreover, in trying to maintain the connection 
between rules of criticism and rules of agency, Chrisman explicitly attempts to retain the 
prescriptive reading of ‘ought.’ The problem with Chrisman’s solution is, however, that it loses 
sight of the relevant agent. Consider:  
(1) Anne ought to write the report.  
If analyzed as:  
(2) One ought to bring it about that Anne writes the report,  
it becomes ambiguous regarding who ought to bring it about. In ordinary language the meaning 
is rather clear: it is Anne herself who ought to bring it about that the report is written. Of 
course, there remains a possibility that the statement refers to someone else, perhaps Anne’s 
secretary, whose job is to make sure that Anne does everything she ought to do. But consider 
then an everyday-language statement: 
(3) You ought to believe p. 
When formulated as: 
(4) One ought to bring it about that you believe p 
the proposition makes very little sense. There is no one whose job it is to see to your beliefs but 
yourself. Other people have even less control over your beliefs than you do—evil demons aside. 
Chrisman’s solution therefore fails to properly respect the prescriptive sense of ‘ought.’
2
  
Is there any way to avoid the ambiguity? Chrisman (2012) hints that the scope of the 
relevant agents could be restricted by context. This would get rid of the ambiguity in (2): unless 
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Anne really has a secretary, it is reasonable to interpret the statement as referring to Anne 
herself. However, (4) remains as puzzling as ever. The only reasonable scope of agents here is 
whoever is referred to as ‘you’ in a given context. That would be equivalent to replacing ‘one’ 
with ‘you’ in (4), thereby getting: 
(5) You ought to bring it about that you believe p. 
This formulation, however, looks alarmingly like doxastic voluntarism, since it is very natural to 
read the phrase “to bring it about” as involving voluntary guidance. Remember that we wanted 
a formulation that only materially implies agency, without requiring that the subject of the 
proposition is the agent in question. But perhaps there is a way to read it otherwise. Here is a 
suggestion: 
(6) You ought to be in a state such that you bring it about that you believe p. 
But this formulation is not helpful either. It means that what we are doing is again merely 
evaluating the agent according to some standard, which is not the same thing as prescribing an 
action.  
To see why evaluating agency is not equivalent to prescribing, it is helpful to consider 
an example. Imagine an agent, call him Derek, who has deuteranopia: his eyes do not perceive 
the color red. Because of this inability, his color judgments are systematically more or less off, 
depending on the amount of red in the color in question. For instance, he perceives purple and 
blue as equally blue. We can evaluate most of his color judgments individually as faulty: he just 
does not get them right. The fault also seems to derive from his agency in the sense that the 
fault is not due to any outside factor, poor lighting conditions, colored lights, or some such 
thing. Instead, the faulty judgments stem from Derek’s own doxastic system. Still, it would seem 
unfair to hold him accountable for the mistakes. 
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Now let us consider a contrasting case. Suppose that Derek works in a laboratory where 
his job is to make diagnoses. One disease, examplisis, is diagnosed by adding a few drops of an 
indicator liquid to the sample. The sample will then turn purple if it is positive, and blue if it is 
negative. Unfortunately, due to his deuteranopia, Derek is unable to tell the difference between 
blue and purple, rendering him unable to make the correct diagnosis. By contrast, his colleague 
Jerek has no physical incapability. He has just never been interested in colors and never 
bothered to learn to distinguish but the most basic of them. Think of the proverbial husband 
who, when his wife asks him to buy a can of fuchsia-colored paint, comes back with a can of 
magenta wondering what the difference between them is; are they not both sort of pink? 
Expand this example a bit and we get Jerek. Now, both Derek and Jerek are, evaluatively 
speaking, unreliable in their diagnoses of examplisis, and their unreliability is grounds for not 
asking their advice when the goal is to get a correct diagnosis. But in addition, Jerek seems 
responsible for his mistake in a sense that does not apply to Derek. 
Derek’s mistakes may be attributable to him, but there is no way to reason him out of 
his condition. There is a certain range of epistemic reasons that he is not capable of responding 
to, even with the help of the second-order reasons he might recognize when he realizes that he 
is unable to do his job well. His inability blocks the prescriptive sense of ‘ought.’ We cannot 
expect him to change when presented with reasons to do so. Jerek, on the other hand, has no 
such excuse. There is a sense in which we could reasonably expect him to improve his 
judgments because there seems to be a gap between his abilities and his actual performance. 
This gap is where the prescriptive ought finds its grip; it is where we place responsibility 
attributions. So, in order to distinguish between Derek and Jerek, we need more than just an 
evaluation of agency. 
In conclusion, the No-Ought-Implies-Can strategy fails to solve the problem of doxastic 
ought because it fails to capture the prescriptive sense of ‘ought.’ The challenge is to find a 
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distinctively epistemic agency which does not require voluntary control, but which does not 
collapse into mere evaluation either—a type of agency that resides somewhere between 
voluntary control and evaluation of states of affairs. I will turn to views that aim at precisely this 
in the next section. 
 
 
3 The Process View 
 
The NOIC strategy shares with doxastic voluntarism an implicit assumption that the ‘can’ in 
‘ought implies can’ requires voluntary control (Shah 2002, Chuard & Southwood 2009) and 
tries to avert it by giving up the prescriptive ought. Resisting this assumption therefore opens up 
new theoretical space for spelling out conditions for doxastic responsibility.  
A popular move is to model doxastic agency after the more familiar practical agency 
but identify a type of control which is distinct from voluntary control and which is exercised in 
cognitive activity such as reasoning or inquiry. According to these views, belief itself is a non-
agentive, static state, but doxastic agency is located in the belief-forming processes or in the 
possibility of consciously reflecting and endorsing the belief after it is formed. These processes 
can be understood as a form of control themselves, and the notion of control as something 
distinctively epistemic, such as cognitive control (McHugh 2013), evaluative control (Hieronymi 
2008, 2009), or rational control (O’Brien 2007).
5
 For example, in McHugh’s view, conscious 
control through inquiry is necessary for doxastic responsibility, but often only dispositionally so: 
the agency that we have over automatic beliefs is such that we would consciously endorse them 
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 Something along these lines has also been proposed by Peacocke (1998), Shah and Velleman (2005), Soteriou 
(2005), and Cassam (2010). 
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when prompted, or we may reject them when considering the issue more carefully. An agent 
can therefore be held responsible for the act of reasoning or judging, or for being in a position 
to exercise such reasoning, whether or not it was actually exercised (McHugh 2011, 2013). 
The process view seems at first a happy compromise that acknowledges both the role of 
reasoning and that beliefs themselves are not active. It would allow us to agree with the skeptics 
that beliefs are not subject to voluntary control, that beliefs themselves are not an exercise of 
agency, and that many of our beliefs are automatic, something we cannot help but have, in the 
way that sensory beliefs often seem to be. This way, the only kinds of norms that apply to 
beliefs themselves are standards of correctness. Yet we could insist that there is a genuine, 
distinct type of doxastic agency which is exercised in the act of belief-formation—in consciously 
deliberating, evaluating, reasoning, or judging whether p is the case—and that this is the domain 
of the prescriptive ought that Alston wrongly assumed to require voluntary control.  
Unfortunately, the process view comes with implausible commitments. The insistence 
that beliefs are not themselves agentive is problematic because it means that the process view 
cannot explain what has come to be called the transparency of belief. In short, the problem 
starts from the observation that when asked whether I believe p, the most straightforward way 
to answer the question is to consider directly whether p is the case (Moran 2001, 2012). The 
puzzle here is to explain how a question concerning one’s mental states is apparently 
transparent to a question concerning something else entirely. This poses a problem for the 
process view because in that view beliefs are just the outputs of one’s deliberative processes, 
stored somewhere in one’s memory like jars on a shelf. Therefore, it seems puzzling that in 
order to answer the question whether I believe p, the most straightforward thing to do is to 
engage in the process of asking whether p is the case, rather than just checking the shelves to 
see whether there happens to be a belief that p in there somewhere. By contrast, if someone 
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asks you whether you have strawberry jam in your cupboard, the most straightforward thing to 
do is not to start preparing strawberry jam right away, but rather to go and check the shelves. 
Moran argues that the transparency is made intelligible only if I can reasonably assume 
that whether I come to believe p is somehow determined by my considering the question of 
whether p is true: 
 
I would have a right to assume that my reflection on the reasons [for P] provided an 
answer to the question of what my belief (…) is, if I could assume that what my belief 
here is was something determined by the conclusion of my reflection on those reasons. 
(Moran 2003, 405) 
 
Thus, in Moran’s view, what explains the transparency is an agent’s capacity for making up her 
mind—her doxastic self-determination. Doxastic agency must be such that it puts me in a 
position to know, on the basis of drawing the conclusion p, that I believe p (Boyle 2011, 8). 
Boyle argues, furthermore, that a related point must apply to the grounds on which my 
conclusion is held: “If I reason ‘P, so Q’, this must normally put me in a position, not merely to 
know that I believe Q, but to know something about why I believe Q, namely because I believe 
that P and that P shows that Q” (ibid.). 
Initially it may seem that the process view can easily accommodate this datum, but 
Boyle argues that this is not the case. This is because, as both Moran and Boyle emphasize, 
transparency and self-knowledge hold for beliefs generally, but the cognitive control view must 
see them as holding only on those occasions when one consciously deliberates whether p, 
whereas the bulk of our beliefs would not come within the sphere of self-knowledge. Boyle 
considers a response by Shah and Velleman which makes precisely this distinction: 
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If the question is whether I already believe that P, one can assay the relevant state of 
mind by posing the question whether P and seeing what one is spontaneously inclined 
to answer. In this procedure, the question whether P serves as a stimulus applied to 
oneself for the empirical purpose of eliciting a response. (…) By contrast, the question 
whether I now believe that P is potentially transparent to the question whether P in the 
capacity of just such an invitation [to reasoning]. (Shah and Velleman 2005, 506-507) 
 
Shah and Velleman emphasize that the procedure of eliciting a spontaneous answer from 
oneself must be a brute stimulus and requires one to refrain from any reasoning because the 
reasoning might accidentally alter the state of mind one is trying to assess. They propose a strict 
distinction between an occurrent act of reasoning, in which doxastic self-governance is 
exercised, and the stored results of previous acts of such reasoning, which are of course the 
products of doxastic self-governance but the recollection of which is not agentive. 
Boyle (2011, 10) argues that the distinction is not tenable. First, if the only point of 
asking myself “Do I believe p?” is to elicit a spontaneous response, then it seems that it should 
be an open question for me as to whether I believe p, just as it would be an open question 
whether there is strawberry jam in the cupboard. But that seems to leave commitment to the 
truth of p out of the picture. If I recall what I believe about p, surely I must also recall what I 
think about the truth concerning p, that is, what I call to mind cannot be only the past 
assessment of the question, but also the present. 
Second, Boyle argues that when an agent is questioned about her existing beliefs, we 
also expect her to be able to provide her grounds for those beliefs, whether or not she has 
consciously deliberated on the issue.  Of course, an agent may fail to provide reasons, or her 
reasons may be inadequate, but the point is, no one questions the applicability of such 
questions even concerning one’s automatic beliefs. Rather, the agent is held criticizable for 
holding beliefs on inadequate grounds, and this criticism is directed at what she presently 
believes, not only at how she formerly reasoned. 
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To sum up, the distinction between two different temporalities is implausible because 
we tend to interpret the products of an agent’s past assessments as something she presently 
actively believes, something the truth of which she is committed to, and for which she sees 
(some) grounds for being committed to. The emphasis that Shah and Velleman place on the 
empirical observation of one’s own responses is suspect because it seems that it would leave 
automatic perceptual beliefs outside doxastic responsibility. Since perceptual beliefs are not 
formed by deliberation, it is unclear how I could access the grounds on which the belief is held 
merely by self-observation. McHugh includes perceptual beliefs under doxastic agency via 
dispositional control. He argues that even though perceptual beliefs are in general automatic, 
we are able to exercise dispositional control over them by pausing and reconsidering when 
given some higher-order evidence (McHugh 2013, 134-135). But this is precisely the type of 
reasoning that Shah and Velleman place in the second category, that of actively reasoning 
whether I now believe p. The original, automatic belief remains opaque. 
The problem stems from the strict distinction between active cognitive processes and 
static doxastic states over which the processes govern. The connection between a belief and 
agency must be more intimate than the process view allows. While it is plausible that cognitive 
activities such as reasoning, inquiry, and deliberation are important for the responsibility one 
bears for one’s beliefs, they cannot be mere external governing forces. I will argue for a view 
with such an intimate connection at its heart in the next section. 
 
 
4 The Doxastic Perspective View 
 
 17 
The process view resists P1* by rejecting volition and arguing that there is a distinctively 
doxastic type of control at work in doxastic responsibility. The third way to reject P1* is then to 
reject control as a necessary condition of responsibility altogether and embrace some form of 
attributionism about doxastic responsibility. In this section I will offer a brief sketch of one such 
account, the details of which must be left for future work. 
Attributionist views of responsibility hold, roughly, that agents are responsible for those 
actions that can in some way be attributed to the agent: actions that somehow reflect who she is 
as a person, her identity as a moral agent, her moral character, or her evaluative judgments 
(e.g., Arpaly 2003, Sher 2009, Smith 2005, 2008, 2015). The views differ from each other in 
many respects, but what unites them is their denial of voluntary control as a necessary condition 
of moral responsibility. The arguments usually start from the observation that we often tend to 
hold each other responsible for things that are clearly not under voluntary control, things such 
as forgetting, omission, neglect, certain emotional reactions, and crucially, doxastic attitudes 
(Sher 2009, Smith 2005).
6
  
In short, I suggest that beliefs are agentive because they are formed within the agent’s 
doxastic perspective, which is attributable to the agent in a responsibility-implying sense. Unlike 
the process view holds, beliefs are intrinsically agentive and not merely static products of 
cognitive processes: they reveal the agent’s doxastic perspective. I will unpack this below. 
The first step is to recognize that beliefs are never just simple reflections of evidence. 
An agent’s take on available evidence is in part a function of her prior pre-doxastic attitudes 
which manifest in the comparative weight she puts on various pieces of evidence. This is a 
familiar idea presented in different ways across various philosophical disciplines, from the 
 
6
 To clarify, it is not clear whether these authors mean moral responsibility for beliefs or a distinctively epistemic 
assessment. I hold that moral and epistemic assessments are distinct, but the basis of responsibility attributions is 
the same. That is, whether we can credit or criticize an agent for her belief depends on whether that belief is the 
upshot of her agency in the same way that whether we can praise of blame an agent for her behavior depends on 
whether that behavior is the upshot of her agency. 
 18 
theory-ladenness of observation to cognitive penetration of perception. Recently, Babic (2019) 
has argued that an agent’s attitude towards epistemic risk in part determines how she ought, 
rationally speaking, to update her credences in light of new evidence. That is, how an agent 
ought to update her credences depends in part on such factors as how she evaluates the risks 
involved in different types of mistakes. Because such evaluations are not evidential, two agents 
can have the same evidence and still arrive at different beliefs without either of them being 
(subjectively) irrational. This is why beliefs are personal in the sense that they reflect the agent’s 
doxastic perspective.  
But what is doxastic perspective? The notion of perspective is borrowed from Elisabeth 
Camp (2017). This is how she describes it: 
 
On my view, a perspective is an open-ended disposition to notice, explain, and respond 
to situations in the world — an ability to “go on the same way” in assimilating and 
responding to whatever information and experiences one encounters. As such, 
perspectives differ from propositional attitudes -- in at least two related ways. First, a 
perspective determines no truth-conditions of its own […]. Second, having a perspective 
is a matter of cognitive action rather than cognitive content: it involves actually noticing, 
explaining, and responding to situations in a certain way, and not just representing 
situations as ‘to be interpreted’ in that way. In slogan form, perspectives are tools for 
thought, not thoughts in themselves. (Camp 2017, 78-79) 
 
Camp’s notion of perspective is wider than mine because she also wants to include non-
cognitive attitudes under its rubric. As I am only interested in belief-forming methods, I will 
narrow it down to doxastic perspective:  
Doxastic perspective: A disposition to notice, explain, and respond to evidence in a 
manner which forms a systematic and (more or less) coherent view of the world. A 
doxastic perspective does not have truth-conditions; it is a tool for thought rather than a 
thought in itself. 
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 A doxastic perspective is thus not merely about representing evidence as to be interpreted in a 
certain way, but actually noticing, explaining and responding to evidence in a way which results 
in an agent’s personal view of the world. An agent’s doxastic perspective is formed by the pre-
doxastic, non-evidential attitudes that in part determine what she pays attention to, how she 
assigns weight to various pieces of evidence, and how she evaluates the risks involved in 
different kinds of mistakes. 
There are various ways to argue for the attributability of an agent’s doxastic perspective 
depending on the view of attributability conditions one endorses. On George Sher’s view 
(2009), doxastic perspective would be part of an agent’s psychophysical constitution, and as 
such grounds for responsibility. On a Frankfurt-inspired real-self view, doxastic perspective 
could perhaps be construed as the set of second-order evaluations that form an agent’s doxastic 
real self (cf. Frankfurt 1987). On Angela Smith’s (2005) rational relations view, doxastic 
perspective would be agentive because it consists of attitudes that are part of the agent’s web of 
evaluative attitudes. I am going to suggest that doxastic perspective is attributable to an agent 
because it consists of an agent’s goals, cares, and values, which are deeply personal. The agent’s 
goals, cares, and values determine how the agent evaluates the risks involved in various possible 
mistakes, which in turn affect how she evaluates, for instance, the credibility of a source and the 
relative weight of various pieces of evidence, and ultimately how she combines the available 
evidence with her pre-existing beliefs to form or revise a belief.  
How does the doxastic perspective view handle the problems that affect the process 
view? First, because all beliefs are formed within an agent’s doxastic perspective, there is no 
distinction between automatic perceptual beliefs and beliefs formed by deliberation. Doxastic 
perspective affects what one notices and how one responds to it, so even automatic perceptual 
beliefs come under its blanket. Similarly, doxastic perspective determines in part which pieces 
of evidence enter the deliberation and how they are weighted within the deliberation. Second, 
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because there is no strict distinction between non-agentive beliefs and the agentive processes 
which govern them, transparency does not pose a problem. Beliefs are not static, but dynamic 
in that they reflect the agent’s continued take on the relevant reasons. Thus, when asked 
whether I believe p, it makes no difference whether I rely on my memory of my previously 
formed belief, or whether I start assessing the truth of p at that moment: the result will in either 
case reflect my doxastic perspective. When asked for reasons for believing p, I can access the 
grounds on which I hold the belief because they are also part of my doxastic perspective.  
 
 
5 Objection to and clarification of the view 
 
One possible worry for this kind of view is whether it can really account for the prescriptive 
doxastic ought. It might seem that we are after all just evaluating an agent’s beliefs against some 
standard. Where is the agency in all of this? If beliefs are simply determined by my doxastic 
perspective, how can I in any sense be responsible for them? 
Answering this objection requires drawing a distinction between an agent whose belief is 
truly compelled—say, by paranoid delusions or deuteranopia—and one who is merely biased by 
her perspective. So, let us go back to Derek and Jerek. How does the doxastic perspective view 
explain the difference between them?  
Derek’s deuteranopia makes him unable to respond to a certain range of reasons, 
namely, the red pigment in purple. His inability is grounds for exemption from the sphere of 
responsibility practices concerning color judgments: the mistake does not reflect his pre-
doxastic attitudes, his evaluations, or doxastic perspective. Rather, his agency is compromised 
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with respect to color judgments. He is unable to respond to the relevant reasons, and thus we 
cannot expect him to change his view. The most we can do is to evaluate his beliefs from an 
objective point of view. This is a broadly Strawsonian take on things (Strawson 1962, 9). To 
evaluate an agent from an objective point of view is to refrain from treating her as a member of 
the epistemic community, that is, to refrain from treating her as a credible source, one whose 
judgments ought to be taken into account or who has authority concerning some issue. 
Needless to say, to exclude someone from the epistemic community would be a terrible 
injustice if done without a good reason (Fricker 2008), but an impairment in judgment would 
be a right kind of reason. A good reason is one that explains why the agent is unable to 
participate in the community (with respect to a specific question, or more generally), in other 
words, why the prescriptive ought is not applicable to her. An agent whose mistaken belief is 
due to a cognitive impairment can be evaluated as a poor doxastic agent without implying that 
she is responsible for the mistake because her mistake does not reflect her doxastic perspective, 
that is, her goals, cares, commitments, or values. Rather, the mistaken belief only reflects the 
cognitive impairment. 
The doxastic perspective thus does the work in doxastic responsibility that quality of 
will does for Strawson’s notion of moral responsibility: an agent is responsible for those beliefs 
that reflect the agent’s doxastic perspective. Unlike Strawson, though, I hold that exemptions 
may concern only specific areas, such as Derek’s color judgments, without having to 
compromise any other areas of doxastic agency (cf. Kauppinen 2018). Derek may still be a 
highly reliable source concerning, say, mathematics. 
We can use Strawson’s distinction between exemption and excuses to further spell out 
what constitutes an excuse in this picture. In Strawson’s view, excuses do not invite us to modify 
our attitudes towards the agent, but only to view the mistake as one in respect of which reactive 
attitudes are inappropriate, that is, the mistake is not incompatible with the agent’s attitude and 
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intentions being just what they ought to be (Strawson 1962, 7-8). In parallel, a doxastic excuse is 
such that the fact of the mistake is not incompatible with the agent’s perspective and doxastic 
agency being just what they ought to be. Thus, the mistake does not reflect the agent’s doxastic 
perspective, but, say, missing evidence or a temporary lapse of attention. 
In sum, the difference between Derek and Jerek is that Derek’s deuteranopia 
constitutes an exemption from doxastic responsibility regarding color judgments. Jerek’s 
mistake, on the other hand, reflects his doxastic perspective, the fact that he does not find 
colors interesting and thus fails to notice important differences between them. It is fair to hold 
him responsible for his judgments: we can expect him to improve, perhaps with the help of the 





I have discussed three different ways to refute the skeptical anti-deontology argument against 
doxastic responsibility. The first is to deny that ought implies can in the doxastic sphere. The 
second is to deny voluntary control in favor of a distinctively epistemic form of control. I have 
argued that both of these approaches run into trouble. The third solution is to adopt an 
attributionist approach to responsibility and argue that no kind of control is necessary for 
doxastic responsibility. I sketched the outlines of a possible solution along these lines, one that 
ties doxastic responsibility to an agent’s personal doxastic perspective, constituted by her pre-
doxastic attitudes which determine the relative weight an agent gives to various pieces of 
evidence. I closed by arguing that we can then give a broadly Strawsonian analysis of 
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